Stopping the Nuclear Spread after START
, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1993): 15-27
Nuclear proliferation, or non-proliferation, is the catchword today—occupying almost a similar place in the American foreign policy outlook as the US-Soviet arms control had during the eighties. The Clinton Administration's non-proliferation agenda has a mix of sticks and carrots being used against, or offered to, undeclared nuclear states like India and Pakistan or those like Iran and North Korea which are pursuing the nuclear option overtly and have the potential for producing nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. Whether the United States and its Western allies will succeed or fail in bringing proliferators like India and Pakistan into the NPT fold, only time will tell. One's contention is that, even if the declared nuclear states have undertaken drastic reductions in compliance with the NPT, or are in the process of doing so, it will still be difficult for them to convince their would-be counterparts in the Third World not to go for nuclear weapons. Let us accept the fact that undeclared nuclear states like India and Pakistan will not surrender their nuclear sovereignty, no matter how lucrative an offer the Clinton Administration makes in return for that. Unlike North Korea, they have not signed the NPT, and will not do so unless they are accepted by the international community as full-fledged nuclear states in the NPT regime. What is needed for the purpose is a little modification in the clauses of the NPT, which will allow Threshold Nuclear States to join the NPT regime as nuclear powers, even if they have achieved nuclear capability after January 1, 1967. Full Text