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**The Role of the Military in the Polity and Economy under Globalization:
A Comparative Study of Turkey and Pakistan**

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Workshop 12

The Role of the Military in the Politics and Economies of the Middle East

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Abstract

While civilian political forces in Turkey have gradually come to terms with an institutionalized role for the military in national decision making primarily through the National Security Council, the relationship between the military and civilian political forces in Pakistan continues to be unstable due to their failure to agree to some 'rules of the game' guaranteeing the precedence of institutional interests of stability and growth over personal ambitions for power and privileges. The military has not only emerged as Pakistan's main political player, it has also civilianized itself in a manner that contravenes its professional status and threatens the very survival of the civil society. No surprise that it has ended up losing grace in the eyes of the people, while the military in Turkey continues to enjoy public goodwill. Even in terms of corporate pursuits, while the military in Turkey has contributed to the economy through its positivist approach towards the domestic private sector and proactive, globalist engagement with Western firms and Multi-National Corporations; the military in Pakistan has posed a great burden on the economy by continuing with non-profit ventures, monopolizing the relatively under-developed private sector and failing to cultivate any significant linkages with foreign or global businesses. Given the extent of militarization of politics and civilianization of the military in Pakistan, even institutionalizing the role of a Turkish-style National Security Council in the polity may be counter-productive. Unlike Turkey's relatively homogenous unitary state structure, the peculiar ethnic setting in Pakistan's federation, especially its military's ethnic imbalance, makes such a probability all the more predictable.

Introduction

The purpose of the study is to analyse the evolution of the military's role in the polity and economy of Turkey and Pakistan, and compare how each of the two militaries fares in performing this role in the wake of globalisation. Each case study focuses on the following three aspects of the role military plays in the polity and economy in the following three sections: (a) the military's intervention in politics, which traces the roots and causes of military intervention in the two countries, and whether there has been any change in the nature and dynamics of military's conduct vis-a-vis civilian political forces. It also looks at the processes of militarisation of politics, civilianisation of the military and the consequent politicisation of the military, especially in Pakistan whose military is praetorian by nature; (b) the military's social role and image, which assesses whether the militaries of the two countries in their respective civilian engagement have played a positive or negative social role, and how they are viewed by the respective populace as a state organisation; and (c) its corporate pursuits, which discusses the contribution of the military's corporate pursuits to the economy in terms of its impact on the domestic private sector and ability to create viable global business linkages.

Some basic features of Turkey and Pakistan are worth-mentioning, before analysing the nature and dynamics of the role of the civil-military ties in terms of their adjustment, or failure to cope, with the demands and pressures of globalization.. Modern Turkey was born out of a military campaign under the leadership of a soldier, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; while Pakistan emerged on the world map through a sustained democratic struggle led by a political party under the leadership of a politician, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Both the founding fathers had a secular-modernist vision. Yet only Turkey chose the founder's way, while Pakistan went astray. Since the latter's creation in 1947, the two Muslim countries have taken diametrically opposed directions: secularism versus Islamism. Pakistan is a federation and has a multi-ethnic society. Turkey is a unitary state with one major Kurdish minority. Even though the two countries have had close ties at both the military and civilian levels, and have mostly served the American interests in their respective region, their foreign policies have displayed divergent trends: Secular Turkey has an intimate rapport with Israel, while Pakistan is an Islamic Republic having a strong bond with the Arab world. The two countries' perceptions vis-a-vis India, Kashmir, Afghanistan and nuclear proliferation have also differed, even though there seems to be greater convergence of interests over post-Taliban Afghanistan.

A note on the importance of the international factor in shaping the two countries' civil-military ties is also worth-mentioning in advance. For Turkey, geographical proximity to Europe has been a great advantage: for it has helped Turkey in fostering a sustained relationship with the Western world, including strategic partnership with the United States, integration into European security via NATO, and the growing trend towards European integration. Turkey's consistent engagement with the West has not only helped liberalize its economy but also contributed to the democratization of its political culture, including the cultivation of pro-democratic ethos of the military. On the other hand, Pakistan's relationship with the US-led West has been inconsistent, reflecting an opportunistic tendency on the part of both sides. With one exception, each time an ambitious general ruled the country, it somehow became strategically crucial for the United States, and the latter, guided by considerations of real-politick, looked the other way while the military ruler perpetuated his hold over political power. Each time, after achieving its strategic objective the United States has dumped Pakistan. This oscillating characteristics of strategic partnership between the two countries has impacted Pakistan's civil-military ties accordingly. The democratic transition of Pakistan in the 1990s was to a large degree a result of the abandonment of the country by Washington in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989: without American backing, the military found it difficult to perpetuate its domestic political hold.

The Turkish Case

The military in Turkey has played a crucial role in civilian affairs since the republic's creation in 1923—a role that relates to its public image as a guarantor of the guiding principles of founding father Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Himself a military officer, Ataturk not only liberated the country from foreign occupying forces but also laid the basis of a modern secular nation. The military has been the driving force behind Turkey's modernization. Reluctantly intervening four times to change governments since 1960, it has always restored civilian political rule—or at least hovered over it—to restore stability, defend secularism and fight Kurdish separatism. The military sees itself as having an almost sacred duty to protect the indigenous ideology of Kemalism.¹ Having gradually institutionalized its role in the polity,

¹ Gareth Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics*, Adelphi Papers, no 137 (London: Oxford University Press, 2001) p 7. For more information about the Turkish military's role in politics, see William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (New York: Rutledge, 1994); Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, "The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol 26, no 4 (Summer 2000), pp 635-57; and Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," *Comparative Politics*, vol29, no2 (January 1997), pp 151-168.

the military has ventured increasingly into the corporate world, creating the country's most successful business empire.² The guardianship role of the military in civilian affairs may continue due to its growing corporate engagement, and the consequent stake in the capitalist state, as well as due to its traditional concerns such as the threat of political Islam—despite new internal and external challenges to such a role, such as the growth of civil society and the country's quest for European Union membership.

Intervention in Politics

The military's four interventions in politics took place in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. Among them, only two led to direct military rule—1960-61 and 1980-82. The 1971 “coup by memo” only displaced the existing regime. So did the 1997 indirect intervention through the National Security Council (MGK). These interventions took place at times when the military leadership, as well as a significant segment of the population, felt that the survival and well being of the country and its Constitutional system were at stake. The military plays its guardianship role only certain conditions, which include: First, if political or religious extremism threatens to take power or endangers founding principles of the republic (1960 and 1997), or to lead to anarchy and the breakdown of law and order (1971 and 1980). Second, the military does not hesitate to intervene if an elected government tries to resort to majority dictatorship (1960). Third, if the indivisibility of the state is threatened by internal separatism or external aggression (the military controlled the state policy against militant separatism by the Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK, during 1984-1999). Finally, if the civilian political leadership interferes in the military's institutional autonomy, even though no military intervention has yet been triggered by this factor.

Since the 1980s, the military has not only gained more strength vis-à-vis civilian sectors, but, by participating in the civilian authorities' decision-making process, has also begun to extend its authority over areas that were traditionally under civilian control. The military authority has been extended through Constitutional/legal channels, enabling to consolidate its political hegemony more deeply and make it unassailable. The military enjoys institutional autonomy in areas ranging from appointment and promotion to reform and modernization. For instance, the Chief of the General Staff is appointed by the President from the generals who were formerly commanders of the land forces, upon nomination by the Council of Ministers. The fact, however, is that the incumbent Chief of the General Staff, in

² “Empire-Building That Began with the Military Exercise,” *The Financial Times*, 9 October 2001.

consultation with a number of senior commanders, selects his own successor, whom he suggests to the prime minister. The later then forwards this suggestion to the President. It is the office of the Chief of the General Staff, not the Ministry of Defense, which determines defense policy, the military budget, weapons production and procurement, intelligence gathering, internal security and all military appointments, including the force commanders. As far as intelligence gathering is concerned, even though the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) operates under the Prime Minister's office, its head and important positions are filled mostly with serving or retired military officers. However, the agency has not gained so much autonomy as to become a "state within a state."³

The institution that has crystallized the expanded and largely invisible role of the military in civilian matters is the MGK. Initially created by the 1960 Constitution, the 10-member Council includes the Chief of the General Staff, along with his four other service colleagues who head the Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie (police and paramilitary), the Prime Minister, Defense, Foreign and Interior Ministers, and is chaired by the President. It makes recommendations to the Council of Ministers on almost all matters relating to internal and external security. Normally, the MGK meets once a month, but it can be called any time during emergency. The 1982 Constitution enhanced the MGK's role in policy making. Article 118 obliged the Council of Ministers "to give priority consideration to the decisions of the MGK." However, according to the October 2001 amendment to the article, the Council of Ministers is not required to do so anymore. Still the military is likely to dominate the decisions of the Council for a number of reasons.⁴

In military's perception, the commanders are members of the MGK in their capacity as experts on security matters, and not "persons who occupy a certain military post and who have a certain military rank." As compared to their civilian counterparts, the military members of the MGK usually come well prepared to its meetings, thereby gaining an edge over the former in policy making. The military has set up think-tanks which prepare and analyse the background data for the commanders who attend the MGK meetings. The most important of these think-tanks is the West Research Group. Set up in 1997, it researches the evolving threats to the state and how to tackle them, but is preoccupied with the threat of political Islam. In January 2002, another think-tank, the Strategic Research and Study Group,

³ Sakallioğlu, *op cit*, pp 157-61.

⁴ See Ishtiaq Ahmad, "Turkish Model in Pakistani Politics," *The Nation*, 3, 10, and 17 December 1999. Also see Heath Lowry, *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000), pp 41-45; Eric Rouleau, "Turkey's Dream of Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol 79, no 6 (November-December 2000), pp 105-106; and *The Turkish Daily News*, 4 October 2001.

was established to chalk out short-and long-term strategies for managing the post-Soviet changes in international politics, regional and global military balance of power. Occasionally, the military has also benefited from the existence of divergent perceptions about policy issues on the MGK's agenda among the civilian members during the coalition government era (1987-2002). For their part, the military members usually have a united position on these issues.⁵

One crucial way the MGK has claimed further areas of executive power and state action has been through the presidential office's extended powers under the 1982 Constitution.⁶ While chairing the MGK, the President has played an important part in shifting the balance of power in its decision-making process in favor of the military, even if the Council's membership is equally divided between civilian leaders and military commanders. Like his three predecessors since 1983—General Kenan Evren, Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel—President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the former head of the Constitutional Court, tends to defend the status quo by upholding and advancing the Constitutional limits on the political process. Thus, even if representatives of the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government will now present a common position during the Council deliberations—unlike the successive coalition government leaders since 1987—President Sezer may support the military's pro-state approach, rather than AKP leadership's populist concerns.

The post-1980 institutionalisation of the military's role in politics and policy-making has been instrumental in dissuading the military from directly intervening in civilian affairs. The 1997 episode showed that even though the Islamization bid of the Welfare Party Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan had threatened the very secular fabric of the state, the military preferred the Constitutional path of the MGK to eventually bring down the government. Of course, the military's task was facilitated by civil society and public opinion, which had largely turned against the government for the same reason. Since then, the military has indeed engaged in political engineering, but only through applying behind-the-scenes pressures and tactics. For instance, through backdoor maneuvering, the military supported the court cases that eventually closed down the Welfare Party in 1999. Its successor, the Virtue Party, was

⁵ See Metin Heper, *The Military-Civilian Relations in Post-1997 Turkey*, Paper presented at the IPSA Armed Forces and Society Research Committee Conference, 'Globalization of Civil-Military Relations: Democratisation, Reform, and Security,' Bucharest, Romania (29-30 June 2002), pp 12-13; Howe Marvine, *Turkey Today: A Nation Divided Over Islam's Revival* (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 2000), pp 139-144; and Ergun Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp 117-121.

⁶ Sakallioglu, *op cit*, p 158.

divided into two factions in 2001—Virtue Party, and AKP. The former consists of traditionalists, and the latter claims to be ‘modernist.’

In addition, the military has started issuing a larger number of statements pertaining to domestic political developments and foreign policy issues than had been the case earlier. The statements have primarily focused on political Islam, ethnic separatism, economic problems facing Turkey, and also on its quest for EU membership. The military justifies the issuance of such statements due to its traditional and constitutional role as a guardian of the state and its founding principles, and also to make the public aware of its position on issues of national concern so as to avoid media speculations.⁷ Such statements include policy suggestions as well as warnings on political, economic and foreign policy matters. They are either meant to cultivate public goodwill for the military, or are politically motivated and aimed at specific domestic and international audience. For instance, before the 1999 elections, in a warning to the pro-Islamic Virtue Party, the office of the Chief of the General Staff made it clear that the “armed forces” were the “custodian of democracy and secularism” in Turkey.⁸

The military also does not like any attempt by a foreign donor to link its financial aid to Turkey with reduction in its defense expenditure. For instance, in December 2000, after the financial crisis hit Turkey the month before, the International Monetary Fund asked the government to trim the budget for the armed forces as part of reforms in return for \$7.5 billion in emergency aid. By February 2001, the country was hit by another financial crisis, which prompted the office of the Chief of the General Staff to issue an advisory list of steps that the government should or should not take to restore economic stability. Among others, it asked the government not to be “submissive” in its relations with the IMF, and should play a greater role in the formulation of economic programs. Even otherwise, Turkey’s continued strategic relevance for the US-led Western world during the Cold War as well as in its aftermath—especially in the post-September 11 period—has tended to diminish the role of external factors in shaping civil-military relations in Turkey in favor of the former.⁹

Since the February 1999 capture of Abdullah Ocalan, militant leader of the PKK, Kurdish separatism has waned—so has the military’s concern about the threat posed by it to state integrity. Additionally, the outcome of the November 2002 election seems to have brought Turkey out of the turbulent coalition politics of the recent past, during which the failure of politicians to provide either sustained economic growth or political stability

⁷ *Hürriyet*, 6 July 1998 and *Milliyet*, 6 June 2002, as cited by Heper, *op cit*, p 16.

⁸ Ahmad, *op cit*.

legitimized the role of the military as the last bulwark of stability keeping the country from chaos.¹⁰ In the election, the AKP led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan won a landslide victory, establishing the first single party government in the last 15 years—an end that the 1990 constitutional reforms had aimed to serve.¹¹ If Turkey has achieved relative political stability since the November 2002 election, and Kurdish separatism has also waned since 1999, then which other factors are likely to cause stresses and strains in civil-military ties in Turkey, even leading up to an indirect military intervention of the sort of 1997? One, the relative political strength of the AKP and its pro-Islamic or anti-establishment character are likely to create civil-military differences over internal and external policy concerns. Two, the AKP's failure to meet huge public expectations may weaken its domestic political base, forcing it to adopt radical measures against political opponents. Third, if the “conservative democratic” party, to use its leaders' depiction, made further political gains by delivering on its promises, then it may start to implement what some have feared its “hidden agenda” of political Islam.

The first eventuality has started to surface, even though both the military establishment and the AKP leadership have been more accommodative than confrontational towards each other. Some argue that an open challenge by the AKP leadership to the secular establishment at this stage may threaten the party's political survival and unity. After all, the argument goes, the AKP is a federation of ‘modernist’ Islamists, and center-right and center-left forces who chose not to vote for the center-left Democratic Left Party and center-right Motherland Party in the November 2002 election due to their leaders' economic mismanagement in the previous government and the consequent financial crisis and social hardship. For his part, Erdogan has treaded carefully, stressing his support for Turkey's secular system and its quest for EU membership. Even on the rather more sensitive issue of headscarf for both sides, Prime Minister Abdullah Gul backtracked after Chief of the General Staff General Hilmi Ozkok, who took over in August 2002, reportedly warned him not to lift a constitutional ban on headscarves in state buildings, schools, and universities. The prime minister vowed not to upset the secular establishment and to seek a “social compromise” on the issue.¹² For their part, both the opposition Republican People's Party led by Deniz Baykal and President Sezer compromised on Erdogan becoming the prime minister. Opposition

⁹ Douglas Frantz, “Military Bestrides Turkey's Path to European Union,” *New York Times*, 12 January 2001. Also see Rouleau, *op cit*, pp 108-109.

¹⁰ See Jenkins, *op cit*, p 9, who, interestingly, argues that the role of the military has been enhanced rather than eroded by Turkey's experience with parliamentary democracy.

¹¹ *The Turkish Daily News*, 4 November 2002.

members of parliament voted for the constitutional reforms package, which included lifting of the ban on Erdogan from standing for parliament because of a 1998 conviction for alleged religious sedition. On December 31, President Sezer also approved the parliamentary decision, thus paving the way for Erdogan's premiership through victory in the February 2003 by-elections in the Siirt Province.¹³

Earlier, on December 12, the President had rejected the parliamentary decision. Obviously, the change of mind on his part could not have taken place without the consent of the military leadership. Why will the military leadership approve of a decision that goes against a series of legal steps it has supported since the 1997 indirect intervention to prevent the growth of political Islam, including the judicial verdict outlawing Erdogan from electoral politics? Perhaps it realized that confronting the leadership of a party that had just won a landslide victory in the polls, and was singularly controlling the government, could be counter-productive. Another factor could be Erdogan's proactive diplomacy before the 12-13 December 2002 EU summit at Copenhagen, during which he lobbied before key European leaders as well as US President George Bush for securing an early date for the start of EU accession talks with Turkey at the summit. The military leadership may still be having serious qualms about Erdogan's Islamic background, but it has to live with him as long as he retains domestic appeal and international acceptance.¹⁴

However, this does not mean that the military will not watch the political situation carefully as it evolves gradually, and try to prevent the AKP leadership's bids to either de-secularize the state apparatus and society, or curtail the army's political and institutional autonomy. One issue over which the differences between the AKP government and the military leadership have increasingly surfaced is whether the army officers or soldiers expelled by the Supreme Military Council (YAS) had the right to appeal in civilian courts. Even though the December 2002 meeting of the MGK approved a recent decision by the YAS to expel seven officers from the Turkish Armed Forces for "reactionary activities", Prime Minister Gul and Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul expressed "reservation" while approving it. Chief of the General Staff General Ozkok later reacted by accusing them of violating the Constitution. "Of course, this encouraged those who involved in fundamentalism," he stated. However, Erdogan defended the Prime Minister by arguing that he had only exercised his

¹² *The Turkish Daily News*, 10 December 2002. Warning the AKP government not to bring headscarf amnesty, General Ozkok said the military would "not respond positively to the usage of headscarf as a symbol and action to corrode traditions of republic." *The Turkish Daily News*, 16 January 2003.

¹³ *The Turkish Daily News*, 1 January 2003.

¹⁴ *The Turkish Daily News*, 20, 24 November; and 13 December 2002.

democratic right by formally expressing reservations about the YAS decisions. Under Article 125/1 of the 1982 Constitution, “all acts and actions of the Administration shall be subject to judicial review.” However, the decisions of the YAS, which are administrative—i.e., pertaining to promotion, retirement and dismissal of military officers—are considered beyond the scope of administrative justice. AKP leaders argue that the army officers who are dismissed should have the right to appeal in civilian courts. The military leadership contends that this was unconstitutional as well as un-necessary since such dismissals occur after a long and exhaustive investigative process. Since 1997, the Turkish military has been quite active in purging the organization of pro-Islamic reactionary elements, including some generals, who made its rank-and-file and were found to be engaged in non-secular activities.¹⁵

Given that, the military’s invisible role as a guardian of the Turkish polity may continue in the foreseeable future. Obviously, in the light of the questionable track-record of civilian political forces, especially with Islamic leanings, vis-à-vis Turkey’s secular-modernist national journey, the arguments pertaining to the post-1980 institutional and political autonomy of the military need to be balanced with the so many instances of its positivist role in civilian affairs. In terms of modernization and democratization, Turkey has indeed come a long way since starting its republican journey in 1923. Since October 2001, it has adopted a series of radical constitutional reforms, including the removal of death penalty and allowing greater freedom of expression for the Kurdish minority. After the capture of Ocalan in February 1999, even the notion of sparing the PKK leader’s life was unthinkable among majority Turks. Given that, the constitutional reforms as part of Turkey’s EU membership process represent a great leap forward. Without the consent of the military, these reforms would not have been possible.

Societal Role and Image

The military’s sustained guardian role in Turkey would have been impossible had it not been for the level of prestige and trust the military as an institution commands in its society at large. Opinion polls consistently show that the armed forces are the most respected institution in Turkey. In recent times, only President Sezer has been able to rival the military in terms of

¹⁵ *The Turkish Daily News*, 31 December 2002, and 16 January 2003. Explaining why the dismissed army officers had the right to appeal in civilian courts, Deputy Prime Minister Ertugrul Yalcinbayir said, “The military has its own discipline and everybody should obey this discipline. If a soldier is expelled from the military, we cannot deprive him of his right to apply to the court,” he said. Yalcinbayir noted that it was proper to close the court way for military appointments and promotion, but emphasized that the right to apply to the court should be given to people. Speaker of the Grand National Assembly Bulent Arinc argued that all actions and procedures of the administration were subjected to legal inspection according to the Constitution.

popularity. As for politicians, while all of the old political faces like Bulent Ecevit, Mesut Yilmaz and Tansu Ciller are currently discredited, Erdogan is a popular figure. However, his popularity very much depends upon the performance of the AKP government, with which huge public expectations are attached. If it succeeds in reviving the economy and improving social conditions, this will further popularize the party and enhance its leadership's credibility. As far as the military is concerned, its public image as a guardian of the republic and its interests will continue, given its integrity and prestige in society.¹⁶

The military is able to sustain its popularity thanks to its recruitment structure. In terms of its composition, the military is considerably closer to Turkey's Anatolian heartland than the urban elite-led politicians. Three-quarter of the cadets in military academies come from low or middle income families, and are largely representative of the country's geographically, with a slight overrepresentation of central Anatolia and a slight underrepresentation of the south-east, though numerous ethnic Kurds are found in the officer corps, including in the high ranks. Thus, the military plays a crucial role in nation-building and national integration. Moreover, it strictly conforms to carefully designated rules, and keeps track of the developments in the globalizing world. With such a modern and professional outlook, the Turkish military has gained great respect and prestige both at home and abroad.¹⁷

The internal perception of the military is furthermore fed by an educational system that promotes martial values and respect for the military. The assertive sense of Turkish nationhood and nationalism that springs from this history, and keeps being carefully entertained both by the state, has further amplified the national pride vested in the military institution. The political culture of the military encourages a rather ambiguous attitude towards the democratic politics: the young officers give formal acknowledgement to democracy as a form of government, and are strictly enjoined not to engage in politics, but regard it as legitimate to intervene if they believe that the state, or Atatürkist principles, are

¹⁶ See Svante E Cornell, "The Military in Turkish Politics," in Bertil Duner, ed, *Turkey: The Road Ahead* (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p 30. Svante believes that, even though the military enjoys public trust, "exceptions to this include traditional Islamists rejecting its staunchly secularist line, Kurdish nationalists rejecting its allegiance to Kemalist nationalism and the country's indivisibility, and liberals principally rejecting the military's meddling in politics. These groups are nevertheless a minority."

¹⁷ Hale, *op cit*, pp 327-330. For details see, James Brown, "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol 25, no 3 (July 1989), pp 387-403. The military's engagement in counter-insurgency operations against the PKK in south-eastern regions has given it valuable experience and expertise in mountain and guerrilla warfare. Unsurprisingly, since December 2001, Turkey has been part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In fact, between June and December 2002, ISAF operated under the Turkish command.

threatened with collapse. This confirms the argument that the Turkish military is politically engaged, but largely in an arbitrator or guardian role.¹⁸

Insofar as the social approval for military's guardian role in politics is concerned, it has also been shaped by the military's actual performance for public good. For instance, the 1980 coup brought an end to the bloody civil strife virtually overnight. The military's current proactive social engagement in south-eastern regions—with soldiers going to the grass-root level to provide community services such as educating children, providing healthcare and rebuilding housing—has gone a long way in improving its image among the Kurdish population. This new attitude aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the previously disenchanted section of society dwells upon the renewed thinking in the military establishment to address the root-cause of ethnic separatism rather than merely combat its militant ramifications as was the case until 1999. During the February 2001 financial crisis, in an attempt to win over the suffering masses, the military issued a list of measures for the government to adopt in order to overcome the financial crisis. It is no coincidence that, while Turkey pursues its goal of fully entering a democratic Europe, its military still enjoys enormous goodwill among the civil society organizations, including TUSIAD (Confederation of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen), which mostly tend to support the military whenever its relationship with the civilian political forces gets strained.¹⁹

Corporate Pursuits

Just as the military in Turkey has played a considerable role in the political process, a role that is largely sanctioned by society due to historical and Constitutional reasons, its expanding engagements in private business, weapons procurement and production, and defense expenditure have remained beyond the grasp of civilian political forces for similar reasons. It is the office of the Chief of the General Staff, not the prime minister, cabinet or parliament, which oversees arms production and procurement. The same office draws up the annual budget of the armed forces, which is more than one-third of state revenue, around \$9 billion

¹⁸ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Army* (London, I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp 16-17, cited by Hale, *ibid*, p 321-322. Also see Cornell, p 31.

¹⁹ For instance, the civil society organizations that carried out the "Civil Initiative of the Five" against Islamization bids of the Welfare government in 1996-1997 included two labour union confederations, Turk-Is (the Turkish Confederation of Labour Unions) and DISK (the Confederation of Revolutionary Labour Unions), as well as one employers' confederation, TISK (the Turkish Confederation of Employers Unions), and two relatively middle -class career organizations, TOBB (the Union of the Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Stock Markets) and TESK (the Tradesmen and Artisan's Confederation of Turkey).

and about 3.5 percent the Gross Domestic Product. Given the huge amounts involved, such budgetary control affairs the military huge power.²⁰

Over time, the military in Turkey has also emerged as one of the country's most successful business empires. Military-owned businesses operate free of government taxes and duties, and their profits pay for pensions, resorts, and other benefits for members of the armed forces, helping attract and retain top personnel and cementing the soldiers' elevated social standing. Through a large holding company called Oyak, the military has financial interests in 24 companies involved in manufacturing, automobile production, agriculture, construction and finance. It owns a bank, a supermarket chain, extensive real estate and 47 percent of Oyak-Renault, one of the country's two dominant automobile makers. Oyak, the Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund, was established by Parliament in 1961 after the 1960 military coup to provide economic benefits for military officers. It has over 30,000 employees can be tough. The initial source of Oyak 's funds is a compulsory 10 percent levy on the base salary of Turkey's 200,000 serving officers who, together with 25,000 current pensioners, make up Oyak's members.²¹

Among the three or four largest holding companies in Turkey, Oyak is unquestionably one of the most profitable. In the year 2000, its 26 subsidiaries produced profits of \$350 million on combined sales of \$4.8 billion. Oyak is not the only military-controlled conglomerate. Three similar foundations, the Naval, Air Force and Land Forces Foundations also have shares in a variety of civilian public sector enterprises. The army also controls the Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces (TSKGV), Oyak's sister corporation. Established in 1987, the TSKGV benefits from the same privileges as Oyak. It has interests in 30 defense-related companies, manufacturing everything from aircraft and artillery to missiles and telecommunications systems. It employs an estimated 20,000 people and 80 percent of its income is donated to the armed forces.²²

²⁰ Frantz, *op cit.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Roleau, *op cit.*, pp 109-110; Gerassimo Karabelias, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95," in Sylvia Kedourie, ed, *Seventy Years of the Turkish Republic* (London: Frank-Cass Publishers, 1999), p 140. One of the main companies of TSKGV is ASELSAN. Founded by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation in 1975, it is Turkey's leading multi-product electronics company designing, developing and manufacturing modern electronic systems for military and professional customers. It has three main divisions: Communications (producing both military and professional communications systems); Microwave and System Technologies (producing radar, electronic warfare and command-control systems); and Microelectronics, Guidance and Electro-Optics (producing hybrid microelectronic circuits, night vision equipment, thermal cameras, laser ranger/designators and inertial navigation systems). ASELSAN has ranked 32 in Turkey's 'Biggest Private Industrial Companies Category' and 80th in the 'World Defence Industry Category.'

Many of these businesses are partnerships with the elite of the economic world, from powerful and wealthy families of Turkey like Sabanci, Koc and Eczacibasi Holdings—the country’s “emperors” of trade and industry—to private banking barons like Kazim Taskent to multinationals like Goodyear and DuPont. The effect is to align the economic interests of the military and important segments of the business establishment in the country and abroad. For their part, big Turkish corporations co-opt retired senior officers to serve on their boards, not only as compensation for services rendered but to maintain links with the current army brass.²³ The military’s corporate pursuits have been criticized for “blurring the line between the private and public economies and helping militarize the society.” However, there is no doubt that such pursuits have led to the growth of the power and autonomy of the military by “increasing the degree of the political and financial autonomy of the officers corps from the civilian government but also in developing closer, direct ties between the military establishment and leading industrialists at home and abroad.”²⁴

The military has traditionally been a vanguard of the middle class, and naturally more educated and technically equipped to lead the process of modernization—from building up modern communications systems to spreading skilled knowledge. In order to cope with the rise of a civilian elite of businessmen and professionals as a result of the economic liberalization process, the military’s attempt to integrate its top echelons into the existing capitalist order should come as no surprise.²⁵ In fact, the military’s ever-expanding economic activities have integrated it with the capitalist reform process, which on the one hand has strengthened civil-military bonds,²⁶ but also led to a situation whereby the military has no choice but to take keen interest in civilian political affairs.

As for military corporatism, Oyak has indeed made good use of Turkey’s free market transition, especially in the 1990s and beyond. It has entered competitive business sectors such as telecommunication, banking and insurance through both domestic and foreign partnerships. For instance, in 1994, Oyak became the sole owner of First National Bank of Boston (Turkey) and began operating the bank under the name Oyak Bank. Its investment partnership with the Axa Group of France took a new turn in 1997, when the two started a life insurance company, Axa-Oyak Hayat Sigorta. In 1999, Axa-Oyak Holding was established as an umbrella for Oyak’s joint ventures with the French insurer. In 2000, a comprehensive

²³ *Ibid.* Also see Frantz, *op cit.*

²⁴ Karabelias, *op cit.*, p 140-41.

²⁵ Nezh Neyzi, “The Middle Classes in Turkey,” in Kemal H Karpat and contributors, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural Historical Analysis* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), p 147-8, cited by Hale, *op cit.*, p 329.

²⁶ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (New York: Rutledge, 1993), p 14.

restructuring of Oyak's organization and management principles began after Coskun Ulusoy, a US-educated banker, was appointed as the chief executive and president of Oyak with the mandate of making it “grow faster in a fast-changing world and Turkey.”²⁷

Accordingly, changes were made in the top management of most of Oyak's subsidiaries, which now publish audited, Western-style accounts. Such transparency has added to the company's credibility. In August 2001, Oyak complemented its strong presence in insurance with a big push into banking by acquiring Sumerbank—an umbrella for five failed banks rescued by the state—which will enable it to transform its 11-branch Oyak Bank into a network of 148. Oyak aims to move into telecommunication, energy, banking and finance sectors, which could be a bad news the country's other conglomerates. So far Oyak has operated in limited areas and, with the exception of automobile manufacturing, it has not really generated any competition for other groups.²⁸

Oyak's corporate success story rests upon many factors: the traditional public goodwill that the military traditionally enjoys in Turkey is one; its exemption from government taxes and duties as well as the constant financial source via 10 percent levy on the salary and pension of its members is another. However, it would be unfair to overlook two important reasons behind Turkish military's corporate success. First, it is the military that has driven Turkey's modernization process right from the start. The second reason, as a corollary to the first, is Oyak's ability to move along, and even lead,²⁹ the country's transition to free market economy since the 1980s. This could not have been possible had the military not played a key role in the economic liberalization of the country.³⁰

The Pakistani case

Pakistan has been ruled directly by the military for nearly half of its history, and indirectly during most of the rest. The peculiar circumstances of Pakistan's creation in 1947 has meant that the military has had a large degree of influence from the outset. The country was born with a chronic sense of insecurity, caused by the post-Partition law and order problem and

²⁷ “Empire-Building that began with the Military Exercise,” *op cit*.

²⁸ *ibid*.

²⁹ Hale, *op cit*, p 329.

³⁰ Turgut Ozal was no doubt the architect of such a transformation, reflecting the Turkish state response to pressures and requirements of globalization, but the military's initial push and sustained support for the purpose cannot be under-estimated. The military government of General Evren continued the January 1980 economic liberalization program of the Demirel government, and promoted Ozal to the cabinet. He was the only member of the overthrown government to be retained. For details, see Henri J Barkey, “Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition,” *Armed Forces and Society*, vol 16, no 2 (Winter 1990), pp 169-192.

security threat from India. Consequently, the military not only got a key role in national security issues, it also obtained a considerable share in state resources for defense. More importantly, the death of Jinnah in 1948 created a political vacuum, which, in the absence of strong political leadership and institutions, was filled within a decade by the military via its debut coup in 1958. Since then, the military has staged three more coups (1969, 1977 and 1999). The four military rules, pure or diluted, have spanned the following periods: General Ayub Khan (1958-69), General Yahya Khan (1969-72), General Zia ul-Haq (1977-88), and General Pervez Musharraf (1999-present).³¹ Long years in power have also enabled the military to spread so widely in the civilian institutions of the state and society that its presence is now established firmly in all walks of life. It has carved out a role and position in the public and private sectors, industry, business, agriculture, education and scientific development, healthcare, communications and transportation.

Intervention in Politics

The 12 October 1999 military coup staged by Chief of the Army Staff General Musharraf, which overthrew the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had all the ingredients to be different from the previous three: It did not result in a martial law regime, in which people lose their fundamental rights under the Constitution. Not only was the 1973 Constitution held just in abeyance, the national and provincial parliaments were also suspended, not dissolved. Through a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), General Musharraf assumed a rather corporate-style title of the Chief Executive of Pakistan. His cabinet included both civilian and military members. A National Security Council with a similar composition was also set up. The civilian members of the military regime included leading figures from the country's Non-Government Organizations. A top Citibank official of Pakistani origin from New York was appointed Finance Minister. No curbs were placed on the Press. The post-coup situation, therefore, seemed to herald a new era in civil-military relations in Pakistan, whereby the boundaries between the two blurred even while the country was under the direct military rule. The military appeared to respond to the spirit of globalisation: even though it had taken over

³¹ Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (London: Yale University Press, 2002), p 276. For an indebt analysis of the civil-military relations in Pakistan, see Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Saeed Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (Boulder, Col: Westview, 1997); Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen P Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1998); and International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: Transition to Democracy?* Asia Report no. 40 (Islamabad/Brussels: ICG, 3 October 2002).

power from a civilian regime, thus contravening the prevailing democratization trend in the world, it did not want to enforce a purely military rule fearing international backlash.

“The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan,” declared General Musharraf at the outset. Later in 2000 he assured the nation he would respect a Supreme Court judgment that stated he should remain in office just three years. In June 2001, however, Musharraf performed a complete U-turn. Following the examples of his two predecessors, Generals Ayub and Zia, he made himself president. And in May 2002 he held a referendum that allowed him to remain in power for a further five years. In August, after issuing the Legal Framework Order (LFO), the General-President, while defending the inclusion of the National Security Council in the amended 1973 Constitution, made it clear: “If you want to keep the military out, you have to get them in”.³² Thus, what initially appeared to be a new era in Pakistan civil-military ties is concluding in the same old fashion:³³ even though the October 2002 elections have brought a civilian government led by Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali, the strings of power remain in the hands of the military.

Except the era of General Yahya—which proved to be relatively short-lived not because the military wanted it so, but due to its defeat in the 1971 war with India and the consequent creation of Bangladesh out of Pakistan—the collective wisdom of all of the military rules can be summarized in a time-tested three-point formula for governance and foreign policy: (a) Referendum, as a means of perpetuating power followed by some sort of elections to gain legitimacy; (b) Local government as a panacea for all political problems and to ‘create’ a ‘new’ political elite ostensibly to replace ‘old’ politicians; and (c) The American Connection, so that economic and military aid flows to bail out the country.³⁴ Somehow, the last factor has always come along the way to help the military rulers perpetuate their power. While Pakistan’s participation in US-led Cold War alliances in Asia-Pacific, SEATO and CENTO, helped General Ayub, General Zia’s regime thrived on the US-led proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. And General Musharraf has been lucky enough to see Pakistan regaining its strategic relevance for the United States after September 11 vis-a-vis the US-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan.³⁵

³² *The News*, 22 August 2002; Jones, *op cit*, pp 269-75 .

³³ See Sumit Ganguly, “Pakistan’s Never-Ending Story,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol 79, no 2 (March-April 2000), pp 2-7; and Larry Diamond, “Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?,” *Journal of Democracy*, vol 11, no 3 (June 2000), pp 91-106.

³⁴ Mushahid Hussain, “Establishment’s Shifting Allies,” *The Nation*, 10 December 2002. Also see Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 452.

³⁵ See George Perkovich, “Pervez, the Friendly Dictator,” *Weekly Standard*, 29 July 2002.

Politicians in Pakistan have been no angels either. They have mostly acted as co-conspirators of the military, either for fear of victimization or just to enjoy their turn in power. The judiciary fares no better. It legitimized all of the military's coups and its consequent attempts at perpetuation of political power. Despite the military contempt for civilian politicians, all coups in Pakistan have had initial backing from a section of the political forces. The political forces become a source of strength for any incoming military ruler, whose domestic legitimacy is derived from this readily available political support. Even today, all political parties are playing on the military regime's wicket, accepting its ground rules and pursuing the path of power separately. They have demonstrated their proclivity for partisan politicking rather than an ability to unite for their common interests.³⁶

The military is interested in protecting three interests and it intervenes when they are threatened by civilian political forces.³⁷ First, of paramount interest for the military is national security. Given that, it wants to play a dominant role in security-related issues, which include Kashmir, India, Afghanistan, and nuclear issue. Kashmir is particularly dear to the military, and relations with India a sensitive matter. Should any prime minister try to strike a deal on Kashmir without the army's approval, or tries to normalize relations with India, he or she could not expect to survive in office.³⁸ No surprise that the divergent manner in which the political and military leadership perceived and dealt with the Kargil conflict in the spring and summer of 1999 led to a consistently deepening crisis in civil-military relations, eventually causing the October coup. The army had launched the Kargil operation in order to sabotage the Lahore Process of normalising India-Pakistan ties, which started with the visit to Lahore by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in February.

Second, the military wants to retain its political clout and institutional autonomy. Had the second Sharif government in March 1997 not led the parliamentary removal of some clauses of Eighth Amendment in the 1973 Constitution—which gave the pro-military president the arbitrary power to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the parliaments—the October 1999 coup might not have happened. The military also does not like any civilian political interference in its organizational matters. The services chiefs resist the Ministry of Defense's tempering with their personal recommendations, including promotions, transfers and postings. The run-up to the 1999 military coup was marked by Prime Minister Sharif's attempt to make in-roads in the military high command. His dismissal of General Musharraf

³⁶ Mushahid Hussain, "October 12 Three Years After," *The Nation*, 8 October 2002.

³⁷ See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan," *Survival*, vol. 40, no 2 (Summer 1998), pp 99-100. Also see Rizvi, *op cit*, pp 245-248.

as army chief and appointment of Lieutenant General Ziauddin Ahmed in his place triggered the October 12 coup. A year ago, on 5 October 1998, Prime Minister Sharif had forced Musharraf's predecessor, General Jehangir Karamat to quit after he spoke publicly in favour of establishing a National Security Council.³⁹

Third, the military is interested in maintaining an adequate defense budget and ensuring that its corporate pursuits remain beyond civilian scrutiny. It is opposed to any unilateral cut in defense expenditure by civilian leaders. In the fiscal year 1998 Pakistan spent no less than US \$3.2 billion on defense, a sum that accounted for 29 percent of the national budget. The Parliament does not debate the defense budget, which normally has a one-line mentioning in the annual national budget. However, it is true that continuing tension in Pakistan's relations with India, and India's missile and nuclear development, has meant that the defense sector consume a considerable share from the annual budgetary allocations to gain Pakistan's matching nuclear and missile capability. The military also expects a civilian government to ensure socio-economic stability. With its expanding corporate activities, the government's economic policies have also acquired direct relevance. Oversees weapons and equipment procurement is another such interest which the military likes the civilian leadership to promote. For the purpose, the Corps Commanders constantly review the government's political and economic management, especially its interaction with the political adversaries, the handling of law and order and such issues as corruption, misuse of state machinery and patronage. Every Corps Commanders' meeting, held in the Army General Headquarters (GHQ), issues a 'meaningful' statement on the military's perception of national affairs.⁴⁰

During periods when it is out of power, the military often serves as the arbiter between power centers, politicians and state institutions. For instance, the military leadership was involved in the departure from power of each of the four elected governments in the 1990s. The first time that Nawaz Sharif left office, in 1993, it was Chief of the Army Staff general Abdul Waheed Kakar who brokered the arrangement, whereby both the prime minister and the then president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, resigned. During Sharif's second tenure, General Keramat brokered a major dispute between him and President Farooq Khan Leghari. For their part, both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif tried to expand their margin for maneuver with respect to the military. They failed, because of their growing inability to deliver the basic services of government, and by the thickening corruption scandals that swirled around their

³⁸ Jones, *op cit*, p 276.

³⁹ *The News*, 4 October 1998; 20 October 1999.

governments. During the elected governments of the 1990s, three leaders shared power—prime minister, president and the army—popularly called as ‘Troika.’ The military remained in a position of “oversight,” mediating between the holders of overt power, and the prime minister and president both remained dependent on the support of the military to stay in power.⁴¹

One damning outcome of the military’s growing clout in civilian political life is the emergence of intelligence agencies—Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI)—as key players in domestic politics as well as external security affairs. The ISI was instrumental in creating the Taliban. It is accused by India, and suspected by the world, of supporting Kashmiri militancy in India. In several instances since the late 1980s, both the ISI and MI have used financial incentives, state power and divide-and-rule tactics to influence politics, including the creation of opposition alliances to weaken the main political forces and pitting one faction against another in the Muhajir politics of urban Sindh. Both the ISI and MI reportedly played an important role in dividing the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (PML)—the country’s two main political parties, led by Bhutto and Sharif, respectively—before the October 2002 elections. They forced politicians from the two parties to join the ‘King’s Party’—a PML faction called the Quaid League—by manipulating the military government’s anti-corruption investigations under the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The PPP was also divided by using the same tactics. No surprise that the elections resulted in the mainstream politics being captured by either discredited politicians or Islamic extremists, the latter for the first time in Pakistan’s history. However, some even suspect the ISI’s role in the political rise of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of reactionary Islamic groups. They argue that a considerable presence of reactionary Islamists in the parliament will provide an excuse to General Musharraf to gain US/Western legitimacy for his presidency, as a hedge against civilian political supremacy if the latter amounts to the capture of political power by reactionary Islamic forces. Obviously, such an eventuality will be the last thing the US-led West will see happening in Pakistan, the only Islamic republic having declared nuclear weapons capability.⁴²

⁴⁰ Ayesha Siddiqi-Agha, *Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99: In Search of a Policy* (Basington, Hampshire, 2001). Also see, Rizvi, *op cit*, p 2

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² See Hamza Alavi, “The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism in Pakistan,” *The Friday Times*, 21-27 June 2001; International Crisis Group, *op cit*, pp 18, 43; Robert La Porte, Jr, “Pakistan in 1996: Starting Once Again”, *Asian Survey*, vol 37, no 2 (February 1997), pp 118. 55; and Mushahid Hussain, “Pakistan’s Hackneyed Political Script”, *Asia Times*, 27 August 2002.

General Musharraf has also attempted to institutionalize the military's role in the polity through well over two dozen amendments in the 1973 Constitution—in a manner that far exceeds that of his predecessor General Zia, who could not incorporate a National Security Council in the Revival of the Constitutional Order of 1985. The LFO of 21 August 2002 has validated all acts and decrees of the military government, including a five-year extension of Musharraf's presidential term and position as Chief of the Army Staff. It has restored the president's power to appoint the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the three service chiefs—the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. The LFO gives president the power to dismiss the government in consultation with a military-dominated NSC. Thus, the prime minister will have little power or responsibility and will be accountable to the military, not parliament, while the president will be answerable only to the armed forces. Chaired by the president, the NSC will include the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the three service chiefs, the prime minister, the leader of the opposition and the speaker of the National Assembly, and the chairman of the Senate. Wearing the dual hats of president and army chief with the backing of his military appointees, Musharraf will dominate the civilians. A prime minister who tried to assert authority could be in a minority of one since parliamentarians would have the presidential sword of dismissal hanging over their heads. Musharraf says that the NSC will only be consultative but its mandate gives sufficient cause for concern. According to the LFO, it covers “strategic matters pertaining to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the state; and matters relating to democracy, governance, and inter-provincial harmony”.⁴³

The LFO has titled the balance of power in a parliamentary system in favor of a uniformed president. General Zia's Eighth Amendment had also distorted the 1973 Constitution by granting president the arbitrary power to dismiss government. During the failed democratic transition (1989-99), presidents used the amendment three times, at military's behest, to remove elected governments, until the office of the president was deprived of this power by the Thirteenth Amendment.⁴⁴ Some have argued that the Eighth Amendment was a safety valve to prevent military coup and, therefore, its removal from the Constitution eventually paved the way for the 1999 military takeover. General Musharraf has

⁴³ See text of LFO, *Dawn*, 22 August 2002; and *The News*, 22 August 2002.

⁴⁴ The Thirteenth Amendment removed Article 58 (2) (b), depriving the President of the right to dismiss the National Assembly and Article 112 (2) (b), removing the powers of Governors to dismiss provincial assemblies. It also modified Articles 101 and 234 (9) (b), making the advice of the Prime Minister binding on the President in the appointment of Governors and service chiefs. See Mohammad Waseem, “Pakistan Elections 1997: One Step Forward?”, in Craig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy, eds, *Pakistan: 1997* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 2, 14.

defended the creation of the NSC on similar grounds. According to him, the NSC will strengthen democracy by placing checks and balances on the main power brokers—the president, the prime minister, and the army chief. “I only want checks and balances to avoid, once and for all, the imposition of martial law,” Musharraf says.⁴⁵ But how exactly is institutionalizing the army's role in civilian affairs via the NSC the same as keeping the army out of politics?⁴⁶ Given that, the NSC is likely to cause further politicization of the military.

The military's civilianization under Musharraf has also been unprecedented: the General has extended the military's reach into state-run companies and agencies, installing loyal uniformed officers, about 500 of them, in place of civilians at the top of entities that control everything from the phone system and postal service to road construction and computer databases on citizens. He has made no commitment to return any of those jobs to civilians, and the new civilian government is not likely to insist on it. The military has entered such areas of public life where it is least capable to serve. Critics call this the relentless militarization of Pakistani civil society and charge that the generals who seized power promising to rid the country of corruption are now supervising a more subtle form of it.⁴⁷

Three methods are adopted for appointment of military personnel to the civilian jobs. First, a number of serving officers are given prize government jobs or top assignments in government and semi-government corporations and agencies for a specified period after which they return to their parent service. Second, retired military officers are recommended by the services headquarters to the government for re-employment, or the civilian government itself appoints military officers to senior jobs. Third, young officers are inducted permanently in the elite cadres of the Central Superior Services, especially the District Management Group, Foreign Service and Police Service. Since 1980, there has been a 10 percent quota of jobs for the military in the Civil Services. This tantamount to wastage of resources as the

⁴⁵ See *The Nation*, 22 August 2002; and *Dawn*, 13 July 2002.

⁴⁶ Hussain, “Pakistan's Hackneyed Political Script”, *op cit*.

⁴⁷ Paul Watson, “Military Inc, Dominates Life in Pakistan,” *Los Angeles Times*, 7 October 2002. Some of the lucrative civilian positions occupied by the military officers include: two Presidents (Pakistan and Azad Kashmir); two Governors (Punjab and North-West Frontier Province); three Federal Secretaries (Defence, Defence Production, and Railways) three Vice-Chancellors (Engineering University, Punjab University and Quaid-i-Azam University), around two dozen Ambassadors and Consul Generals; and the heads of the following federal government and semi-government bodies: NAB, Federal Public Service Commission, Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), Pakistan Railways, National Crisis Management Cell, National Highway Authority, National Shipping Corporation, Karachi Port Trust, Pakistan Mineral Development Authority, National Fertilizer Corporation, Pakistan Steel Mills, Export Processing Zone Authority, National Telecommunications Authority, Institute of Regional Studies, Pakistan Engineering Council, Directorate of Education, Pakistan Sports Board, Pakistan Hockey Federation, Pakistan Cricket Board.

officers on whom the government has invested its resources leave their military jobs for lucrative careers in the civil service.⁴⁸

Societal Role and Image

The military views itself as the guarantor of Pakistan's internal and external security and stability, and such a role was not questioned by the majority of the people even until as recently as 1999 when they celebrated the October coup. The traditional respectability of the military was rooted in its proactive contribution to the post-Partition rehabilitation of Muslim migrants from India, combating the security threat of India, and stabilizing the political order after the untimely death of Jinnah. However, the rampant politicization and civilianization of the military during the Musharraf era has tarnished its public image and credibility.⁴⁹

The transformation in the socio-economic background of recruits since the 1970s has played an important part in the military's politicization. The first generation of senior officers that came from an upper or upper-middle class background was trained in the British army at Sandhurst and the Indian military Academy, and was deeply "anglicized." In the early 1970s, the officer corps started to draw more heavily from recruits who came from modest urban or rural backgrounds. This generation of officers is more politicized and ambitious, displaying open contempt for civilians and politicians. Moreover, the growing educational standards have not only added to the professionalism and *esprit de corps* of the military, but also fostered a widely shared conviction among military officers that they are the best in society and, therefore, better placed to handle civilian political affairs. That explains why the military has crept into almost every sphere of public life in Pakistan.⁵⁰

This is a very dangerous tendency in a multi-ethnic country such as Pakistan, where only two of the four provinces monopolize military service, civil bureaucracy, economic resources, and even politics. As for the ethnic composition of the military, Punjabis, following the British pattern of recruitment that relied on this "martial race", dominate it. The total

⁴⁸ Mainly to placate the military, the second Sharif government inducted tens of thousands of army personnel into civilian jobs, including road construction, organisation of census, and surveying primary school education. In December 1998, about 35,000 Army Junior Commissioned Officers and Commissioned Officers were inducted in WAPDA to manage power distribution and check 'theft and pilferage' of electricity and related corruption. A serving Lieutenant General and a serving Major General were appointed Chairman and Vice-Chairman of WAPDA and eight serving Brigadiers headed its distribution companies. See Rizvi, *op cit*, pp 234-36, 239.

⁴⁹ See Stephen P Cohen, "The Nation and the State of Pakistan", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol 25, no 3 (Summer 2002), pp 109-22.

⁵⁰ However, the international appreciation of the Pakistani military's professionalism has indeed helped it to globalise its operational activity. The army has been a part of the various UN peace-keeping operations, including Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and Cambodia.

Punjabi strength in the military, consisting of both officers and enlisted personnel, is between 65 and 70 percent, compared with their 56.5 percent share of Pakistan's population. The Pushtoons are the second largest represented group in the military at between 22-25 percent, compared with their national population share of approximately 14 percent. The other main ethnic groups—Baloch and Sindhi—are poorly represented, while the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs are represented in the officer corps but poorly represented in the enlisted ranks.⁵¹ The military sees itself at the center of a centralized state, and as such has traditionally resisted calls for regional rights. These ethnic imbalances therefore arouse resentment among the under-represented ethnic groups. East Pakistan's dismemberment from West Pakistan was primarily caused by this factor. No surprise that, given the growing public concern in Sindh and Balochistan about the "Punjabisation" of Pakistan—since Punjabis constitute the single largest group in the military—the politicians from these provinces have criticized the establishment of NSC, calling it an attempt by the military to re-introduce a "unitary system."⁵² Since the NSC will advise the president on all vital issues, including dissolution of provincial assemblies, these leaders fear provincial governments will become hostage to military dictates. Such fears have historical basis: In the 1950s, the imposition of One Unit in West Pakistan, which abolished the provinces, was instrumental in the creation of two secessionist movements—that of Greater Balochistan and Pushtoonistan, the former had to be crushed through a military action in the 1970s. Of all the sources of instability afflicting Pakistan, the ethnic and provincial question is perhaps the most fundamental, because it calls into question the very basis for Pakistan's national existence. Viewed as a "Punjabi organization," the military cannot tackle it.

The military's domination of politics, its growing civilianization and corporate pursuits are deeply resented by the aggrieved sections of the Pakistani society, which apart from Sindhis and Baloch, include a section of the Punjabi and Pushtoon population. There are also other reasons why the traditional supporters of the military have now turned against it. First, in its anti-tax evasion drive, the Musharraf regime attempted to impose a General Sales Tax as a means to generate government revenue. Not only has this largely good-intended attempt failed to deliver, it has also annoyed a significant number of the traders and retailers. Second, besides its political opponents, the Musharraf regime also targeted civil bureaucracy in its anti-corruption drive, thereby annoying one of its traditional partners in governance

⁵¹ Azeema Faizunissa and Atif Ikram, *Pakistan's Population: Statistical Profile 2002* (Islamabad: 2002), cited in International Crisis Group, *op cit*, p 6.

⁵² *Ibid*, p 39.

since Ayub's days. The civil bureaucrats have resisted the military's increasing propensity to occupy lucrative civilian government and semi-government positions. Third, by exempting the serving officers from corruption investigations, General Musharraf has further tarnished the military's comparatively cleaner image vis-a-vis that of the civilian politicians. In particular, his government's shabby handling of the corruption case against former naval chief Admiral Mansur ul-Haq (1994-97) for receiving kickbacks on defense contracts has confirmed the military's collusion with corruption. Even though the Admiral was extradited from the United States, the NAB struck a deal with him, in which he secured his freedom by promising to pay back US \$7.5 million to the state. Reportedly, in defense deals in the last 20 years, of approximately US \$10 billion in purchases of military equipment, almost 10 percent, i.e., US \$1 billion, has been siphoned off through corruption, commissions and kickbacks.⁵³

Fourth, the growth in anti-military sentiments among the people, especially in Punjab and Sindh, is also due to the military's vendetta against the two main political leaders—Bhutto and Sharif—the former living in exile in the UAE and the latter in Saudi Arabia. Finally, the military's naked misuse of political power, through ISI- and MI-led horse-trading, wheeling-dealings and divide-and-rule tactics, has exposed it in the eyes of the people, thereby clouding its previous public image as an organisation which is professional, clean and “above politics.” It is no coincidence, therefore, that the military is increasingly viewed in public circles as an “occupation force.” ‘Pakistan is not a state with an army, but an army with a state,’ goes the argument, which is based on the following rationale: The reason Sharif and Bhutto have been pushed out of the country is because both challenged the military's supremacy in politics. This implies that if any politician wants to play politics in Pakistan, he or she has to play it on the military's terms.⁵⁴

The military has also been Islamised over time. When the Pakistan army was created out of the British Indian army, its leaders emphasized Islam as a unifying force, along with other values of military life derived from the British colonial period, such as discipline, internal cohesion, efficiency, professionalism and *esprit de corps*. The pragmatic requirement to integrate a diverse military force drove this melding of religious and secular values, but the ideology of the Pakistani army remained largely secular. This changed during General Zia's

⁵³ *The News*, 1 January 2002; Jones, *op cit*, pp 281-90. The Musharraf regime has also engaged in nepotism. In September 2002, the head of a private consortium building a major highway admitted at a new conference that he won the US \$ 117 million contract—awarded without competitive public bidding—with the help of retired Brigadier Aftab Khan, the father-in-law of Maseera's son Bill. See Watson, *op cit*.

⁵⁴ And goes another popular remark: ‘while the military has won none of the three wars with India, it has conquered its own country four times in a coup.’ As to why Pakistan continues to survive despite abysmal

11- year long rule, when the military-led process of Islamisation transformed the polity's traditionally moderate Islamic creed into an extremist Islamic culture. The US-sponsored Mujahideen war against the Soviets in Afghanistan assisted the military regime's regressive policy, even though it was primarily aimed at legitimising and consolidating the military rule in an ethnically fragmented society. Since then, radical Islam has penetrated the rank-and-file of the military establishment, especially the ISI, which has itself gained the notorious status in both domestic and international opinion, as a "state within a state."⁵⁵ Ever since his historic U-turn vis-a-vis Taliban in September 2001, General Musharraf has attempted to reverse Zia's legacy, reducing the influence of radical Islamic elements in the state apparatus and society by outlawing radical Islamic groups and changing the curriculum of the *madrassas*. However, such measures remain far from bearing any fruit because the cancer of Islamic extremism has spread so deeply in the body politic—as clear from the MMA's electoral success—and also because it is the American pressure, rather than any domestic impetus, that seems to have primarily motivated the regime to act against Islamic extremism.⁵⁶

Corporate Pursuits

As a consequence of its long involvement in civilian political affairs, the military now controls a vast industrial and business empire which has enabled it to amass sufficient clout in the economy and develop a stake in the government's economic policies and industrial and commercial strategies. Taken together, the military's industrial and business enterprises account for nearly 3 percent of Pakistan's Gross National Product. Each of the three military services has its own corporate ventures, even though the army dominates the military's corporate ventures, which can be divided into three major categories: those directly under the administrative control of the Army Chief; those looked after by the Defense Production Division of the Ministry of Defense but headed by the serving officers appointed by the Army Chief; and four charitable trusts set up for the welfare of ex-service personnel which operate in an autonomous manner in the private sector, even though their management varies.⁵⁷

failure, a common perception since General Zima's days has been that it is due to three As: Army, Allah and America. See

⁵⁵ See Alavi, *op cit*. Two instances explaining the growing influence of Islamic radicalism in the military are worth-mentioning: In 1995, a military coup by Major-General Zaire up-Islam Abbasid, Brigadier Mustangs Zillah and other senior army officers—aimed at capturing the GHQ, then overthrowing the Bhutto regime and establishing a *Shari* regime with General Abbasid as *Emir ul-Momineen*, was pre-empted by the military. Tanzeemul Ikhwan movement, which is made of retired military officers, openly campaigns for radical Islamic reforms.

⁵⁶ Jones, *op cit*, p 290.

⁵⁷ Timothy Hu, "Forces in Business," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 14 February 2001, pp 10-16.

The first category includes the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO), Special Communication Organisation (SCO) and National Logistics Cell (NLC). The FWO is a road and bridge construction company which, since 1966, has undertaken projects worth around half a billion US dollars. Manned by the Corps of Engineers, the FWO has a subsidiary business sending mine clearers around the world—an activity that, during the 1990s, earned around US \$10 million a year. The SCO, which is manned by the Signals Corps, looks after telecommunication in the Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Northern Areas. Established in 1978, the NLC has emerged into a trucking and transportation giant in the country. The NLC is said to have played a key role in delivery arms and other supplies to Afghan Mujahideen during the anti-Soviet war. It has a fleet of over 2,000 vehicles, with a carriage capacity of 50 000 tons of dry cargo and nine million liters of fluid cargo. The NLC also undertakes other activities like construction of roads and bridges, spraying of pesticides, locust control, and logistic crisis management. Its total strength is 6,578 retired and serving army personnel. The second category of Army's corporate ventures includes three defense-related establishments: Pakistan Ordnance Factories, Heavy Industrial Complex, and Aeronautical Complex. While the first two produce light and heavy weaponry and other military-related equipment, and accommodate service personnel from the Army; the Aeronautical Complex manufactures and re-builds aircraft and related equipment, and employs Air Force personnel.⁵⁸

The third category of the military's corporate ventures are four charitable foundations: Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, Shaheen Foundation, and Bahria Foundation. The Ministry of Defense runs the Fauji Foundation; Army Welfare Trust is managed directly by the GHQ; Shaheen Foundation by the Air Force; and Bahria Foundation by the Navy.

Established in 1953, the Fauji Foundation is the biggest conglomerate in the country. It has assets worth nearly US \$2 billion, which include 11 major industrial projects out of which six are shareholding projects. The Foundation has sugar mills, chemical plants, fertilizer factories, cereal and corn plants, and a cement factory. In the energy sector it owns a gas company and power plants. Corresponding to the globalizing trends, the Foundation has also undertaken three joint ventures with foreign companies including in cement production with a Danish company, power generation with an American company, and fertilization production with a Jordanian company. The Foundation also manages three types of welfare projects in the fields of education, medical assistance, and training and rehabilitation. It owns

⁵⁸ Rizvi, *op cit*, pp 236-39; Jones, *op cit*, pp 277-78.

over 800 educational institutions and more than 100 hospitals. About 6,000-7,000 military personnel are employed by the Foundation, whose total strength is approximately 45,000.

The Army Welfare Trust is the second largest military business, with assets worth nearly one US \$1 billion. Created in 1971, it runs 26 commercial projects, including sugar and woolen mills, cement plants, agro-industry, pharmaceutical industry, power generation, petrochemicals, aviation and a shoe factory. It has also established financial institutions like Askari Commercial Bank, a general insurance company, a leasing company and share registration. It is also experimenting with small-scale business ventures like catering, travel agency, petrol pump, and security services to provide armed guards and related assistance. It provides jobs to approximately 5,000 ex-servicemen. Besides the Askari Bank, the Trust's most flourishing business relates to real estate development, including housing and commercial market schemes. Unlike the Fauji Foundation, the Trust does not run any charitable projects: all its profits are sent to GHQ, which administers it. About half of the income generated by the Trust is used to pay army pensions.⁵⁹

Established in 1977, the Shaheen Foundation runs ten projects, including airliner Shaheen Air International, a cable Pay TV, a radio channel FM-100, air cargo, airport services, aero-trading, insurance, real-estate, information technology, and knitwear. The Foundation is managed by a Board of Directors consisting of Air Force personnel and headed by the Air Force Chief. Its annual turnover is around US \$12 million. Reportedly 10-20 percent of the annual profits is spent on welfare activities. The Foundation employs about 200 ex-servicemen, while the total number of employees is about 1,500. The Bahria Foundation of the Pakistan Navy is a relatively smaller charitable organisation. Established in 1981, it owns businesses in the shipping, fishing, travel, real-estate development, farming, port management and paint production sectors. It also runs a university with nation-wide campuses. The Foundation has a joint venture with a German company in plastic manufacturing. Its management structure is similar to that of Shaheen.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* In addition to the multi-campus Bahria University, a military-managed National University of Science and Technology (NUST) has also been operating since 1991 with nation-wide campuses. It includes nine colleges: College of Engineering, College of Signals, College of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, Army Medical College, Pakistan Navy Engineering College, College of Aeronautical Engineering, National Institute of Transportation, Institute of Environmental Sciences and Engineering, and NUST Institute of Management Sciences. The NUST advertisement in *Dawn*, 30 December 1998 is cited in Rizvi, *op cit*, pp 238-39.

It is questionable whether all of the military's corporate ventures are commercially viable and professionally useful. There are four reasons for this.⁶¹ First, since these foundations have been given a cover of private sector operations, the government auditors cannot audit their expenditure. Given that, their claims of profitability may not always be true. Second, many of the businesses managed directly by the military, such as Shaheen Foundation, have suffered financial losses. In fact, the Foundation nearly collapsed in 1998 after an investment in a road toll project went wrong and Shaheen Air International also stopped operating following a failed joint venture. Third, the involvement of senior serving and retired military officers in defense scandals has damaged the credibility of the military's corporate ventures. In 1995, a South African insurance company Hollard Insurance Ltd named corruption by Shaheen Foundation as the main reason why their joint insurance venture collapsed. The fourth reason why military-run businesses tend to fail is because military officers' training in warfare, fighting and maintaining a certain level of discipline does not necessarily qualify them to manage business activities too.⁶²

This is clear from the military's corporate ventures in partnership with private concerns, which prove more profitable because they combine the military's managerial skill with the innovative ability of the private enterprise. A somewhat similar approach has been adopted by the Askari Bank, whereby civilian experts devise the business strategies while the ex-uniformed personnel provide the overall management. Most of the bank's senior officials worked for former Bank of Credit and Commerce (BCCI).⁶³ Moreover, military-run businesses are in a good position to lobby for tax exemptions and subsidies. By managing to register itself as a charity, for example, the Fauji Foundation has avoided paying tax on its income. The military enterprises also benefit from the fact that Pakistani consumers favor organisations which have army backing because they believe they will never be allowed to go bankrupt.⁶⁴

While non-profitable military-run businesses are a burden on a poor country like Pakistan, even the existence of relatively successful ventures can be questioned because the private sector in the country is not sufficiently vibrant, and the market does not provide a lot of opportunities. Given that, the military's corporate ventures operate at the expense of the civilian private sector. In some instance, even the private sector and foreign firms employ

⁶¹ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, *Power, Perks, Prestige ad Privileges: Military's Economic Activities in Pakistan*, Paper presented at IPCOS Conference on 'Soldiers in Business: Military as an Economic Actor,' Jakarta, October 17-19, 2000.

⁶² *Ibid*, p 31; Hu, *op cit*, p 12.

⁶³ Agha, *op cit*.

retired military officers in order to secure commercial interests by using the military's political clout. The situation is further compounded by the fact that some of the military's corporate ventures are monopolistic. For instance, in the construction and transportation sectors, the NLC and FWO have forced private companies like Gammon out of business by grabbing huge business contracts from the government through the influence of the military.⁶⁵

Comparison and Conclusions

As far as the role of the military in the polity and economy under globalization is concerned, the contrast between Turkey and Pakistan is crystal clear. In fact, the two cases reflect both an irony and a dichotomy: the irony is that, even though Turkey was created by a soldier through success in a war and Pakistan was liberated by a politician through a political struggle, it is the latter where the military has come to call all the political shots, while the former displays a consistent military tendency to stay aloof from politics and let democracy take roots in society. While the dichotomy is rooted in Turkey's relatively homogenous social structure in a unitary polity versus Pakistan's rather complex multi-ethnic situation in a federal setup—meaning where the military can afford to rule long years, it has not; and where it cannot afford, it has.

No surprise that the Pakistani military has ended up losing grace in the eyes of the people, while the military in Turkey continues to enjoy public goodwill. However, there are other reasons for the prevailing divergence in public opinion vis-à-vis the militaries of Pakistan and Turkey. For instance, the ambitious and opportunistic manner in which the military in Pakistan has tried to dominate politics and grab civilian positions—at the expense of civilian political forces—as against the Turkish military's preference for the opposite. Even in terms of corporate pursuits, while the military in Turkey has contributed to the economy through its positivist approach towards the domestic private sector and pro-active, globalist engagement with Western firms and Multi-National Corporations; the military in Pakistan has posed a great burden on the economy by continuing with non-profit ventures, monopolizing the relatively under-developed private sector and failing to cultivate any significant linkages with foreign or global businesses.

Unlike its Pakistani counterpart, the Turkish military accepts the legitimacy of both democracy and civilian rule. It is not praetorian as the Pakistani military is: for it has not tried

⁶⁴ Jones, *op cit*, p 278.

⁶⁵ Agha, *op cit*.

to undermine democracy or usurp civilian authority. The Turkish coups, unlike Pakistan's, have been surgical operations, whereby military secures the intended objective and returns to the barracks. The Turkish military has never been interested in establishing a "military regime" in the sense of serving officers wielding executive and legislative powers—as it has been the case in Pakistan. Instead, it has asserted its effectiveness mostly through the medium of the army rather than infiltrating civilian institutions. Since the military in Turkey has accepted the legitimacy of democracy and civilian rule, it tends to prefer legal/constitutional, historical/cultural, and structural reasons and mechanisms to disguise its political weight or retain its privileged position in the state structure.

While the military in Turkey has never overtly compromised the democratic process, by rigging elections for example, its role as an overseer of elected officials has left its imprint on Turkish democracy. The military leaders have not hesitated publicly to intervene in politics and even oust parliamentary governments to defend Kemalist secularism. There is no evidence, however, that they, acting directly or through military or other intelligence organizations, have intimidated voters or stuffed the ballot boxes. There are no known radical Islamic elements, let alone factions, in the Turkish military. The Islamic elements have been repeatedly removed from the Turkish military. All of this is a total contrast to the Pakistani situation, whereby the military and its intelligence outfits have tarnished the political process and have increasingly been influenced by radical Islamism, or even promoted it.

A comparison between the two militaries in terms of their respective social role and public image also reveals a clearly contrasting situation displaying Pakistani military's regressive performance and unpopular status versus Turkish military's progressive contribution and populist basis. Given the huge imbalance in the ethnic composition of the military, resulting in Punjabi domination, the long military rules have only contributed to greater national disintegration and disunity, even the dismemberment of half of the country in 1971. Moreover, out of an insatiable ambition for political power, the military in Pakistan has consistently adopted divisive tactics, engaged in shabby politicking and employed corrupt means—thereby losing its professional credibility and moral standing in the public eyes. In Turkey, as stated before, the situation is completely the opposite, both in terms of the military's social role and its public image.

In the corporate arena as well, the Turkish military's performance far exceeds that of its Pakistani counterpart. The Turkish military's industrial and commercial concerns have not had any significant monopolizing impact on the private sector due to its relatively developed and vibrant nature, the ability of the military's corporate houses to foster a mutually beneficial

relationship with the country's top business elites as well as build credible partnerships with Western companies and Multi-National Corporations. The last factor has helped the Turkish military to synchronize its corporate pursuits with the pressures and demands of globalization. So has the dynamism and efficiency of the current leadership in the military's corporate ventures such as Oyak. It is only under the globally motivated guidance of such leadership that Oyak has started to invest in areas such as telecommunication, energy, banking and finance sectors, which have thus far been in the private domain. This may upset the private sector since Oyak enjoys some financial benefits for being a military venture. However, since the private sector itself is dynamic and innovative, it will try to expand its horizons or diversify its pursuits in line with the globalising trends rather than resent and resist military's corporatism. Even otherwise, while advancing its corporate interests, the military in Turkey not only prefers to have a smooth and harmonious relationship with the leading players of the private sector, it also maintains a close rapport with the civil society organizations representing a variety of business, industrial, commercial and labor interests.

The relative failure of the corporate pursuits of the Pakistani military's industrial and commercial ventures, both in terms of their relationship with the private sector and in their attempts to build global linkages, is due to the absence of all of the factors that have contributed to the success of the corporate ventures of the Turkish military. Its welfare foundations do have a few partnership investments with foreign businesses, but they are of a very limited scale and the foreign firms involved are relatively unknown. The lack of transparency and the corruption factor have also contributed to the erosion of public support for the military's corporate ventures in addition to limiting their scope for creating global linkages. With nepotism widespread and political clout unchallenged, the military has been able to expand its profitable businesses such as FWO and NLC mostly at the expense of the largely under-developed private sector. As for the relative success of the Askari Bank, factors such as the division of labor and people's trust have indeed helped—the first factor, in fact, brings it closer to Oyak's experiment with banking and other businesses, whereby it combines innovative ability of the private enterprise with the managerial skills of the military personnel. Finally, and more importantly, the rampant politicization and civilianization of the military in Pakistan—as compared to Turkey, where the military has put limits on these rather negative trends or processes—has cast a dark shadow insofar as the public acceptability of its corporatism is concerned.

As far as the future prospects of military's role in the civilian political affairs of Pakistan are concerned, if history is any guide, the current compatibility between the military

and such pliable political forces is likely to be short-lived. It is only a matter of time when the familiar pattern of civil-military struggle for power will re-surface, eventually pushing the country once again back to square one. There have been a number of ‘action replays’ in the country’s civil-military ties, whereby military captures power due to political instability or civilian assertion, legitimizes its unconstitutional rule by subduing the judiciary and co-opting pliable politicians, undertakes a limited withdrawal from politics due to domestic or international factors, and then makes a comeback when politics under civilians goes bad or they start to threaten its interests. In a federation like Pakistan, a permanent role for the military in the power structure evokes feelings of alienation among the smaller provinces, which would see it as a Trojan horse for what they deride as “Punjabi domination.” This is certainly not a healthy basis to promote inter-provincial harmony. Therefore, the NSC will only further destabilise the country, accomplish nothing but greater militarisation of politics and the consequent politicisation of the military. Only democracy can bring long-lasting stability to Pakistan.

The survival of the post-October 2002 political setup in Pakistan will depend upon three factors. First, the direction of civil-military relations, particularly the willingness of the military to give space and autonomy to the civilian government. Otherwise, a needless tussle would ensue over time. Second, relations among the political forces, especially fostering a democratic attitude of tolerance and respect for the strongest opposition to emerge in Pakistan's political history. Third, fallout of the US-led ‘war on terror,’ especially the repercussions of the American manhunt for Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants believed by Washington to have found sanctuary across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

In Turkey, on the other hand, the military’s guardian role will continue in the foreseeable future. And there is a valid justification for this. Presuming if the military had not intervened, would the civilian political system have evolved a self-correcting mechanism, thereby enabling Turkey to institutionalize liberal democracy? The answer can hardly be in the affirmative, if the run-up to all of the four military interventions is considered. For instance, if the military had not intervened in 1971 and 1980, the country would have simply collapsed into civil war and anarchy. Its non-intervention in 1960 and 1997 could have resulted in Islam, rather than secularism, becoming a determining factor in domestic politics and foreign policy. Put such an eventuality in the context of Islamism, its radical off-shoots and their terrorist ramifications in the current circumstances, the two military interventions become all the more justified.

All said and done, however, in the longer run, the military's guardianship role in the Turkish polity does appear to hang in the balance due to two reasons. First, the domestic enlightened opposition to such a role for the military in politics may grow as Turkey moves further towards the European Union accession path. Obviously, the source of such an opposition will be the growing democratic spirit in Turkey due to an unprecedented growth in civil society since the start of the 1990s. Secondly, the European Union itself would require from Turkey to de-militarize its politics in line with its European democratic norms. At the Copenhagen summit, the European Union announced it would start accession talks with Turkey in December 2004, only after Turkey in a European Union review earlier in the year demonstrated further democratic and economic reforms required to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. These reforms preclude the existence of institutions like the MGK that institutionalizes the military's traditionally influential role in policy making in Turkey. Even if the October 2001 constitutional amendments have in principle made it an advisory body, the Europeans may like to have the MGK altogether removed from the country's constitutional structure as part of the Copenhagen criteria.