Another question is why violent Wahhabi anger has shifted from supposed infidels in the subcontinent—as was the case of Syed Ahmed’s war against the Sikhs and his successors’ crusade against Muslim rulers of the time—to the governments and the people of the West.

However, the reality, as Charles argues, is different: Rather than being a reactionary movement against Western imperialism, contemporary Muslim extremism and terrorism is rooted in Muslim history, more specifically with the rise of Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula in the late 18th century and its subsequent spread to South-West Asia at the start of the 19th century. In your articles, you have only focused on how Syed Ahmad and his successors kept alive the violent Wahabi creed in the 19th century. Chares Allen has highlighted other important facts in his works, including the above book, which I think are important to mention here.

For instance,

Any denunciation of suicide bombing at a religious level you mentioned may foster public opinion. However, in my opinion, even such denunciation will fail to transform the potential suicide bombers who are well indoctrinated to accomplish their task. What strategy do you propose to transform young minds who seem to be innumerable these days?

What you termed as “resolute counter-insurgency campaign” of the army gives rise to two questions. Why has the relatively strong army of Pakistan not achieved success against terrorists? Apparently, the army seems to lack the capability to counter few thousand militants. What lesson does the army have to learn from the ongoing counter-insurgency operation as far as our immortal Indian threat is concerned?

You have mentioned the strategy of “clear, hold and build.” Do you really believe think Pakistan is strong enough to complete the three-pronged strategy? Realistically speaking, Pakistan has failed even to carry out the first step, “clear,” in Bajuar.

The concluding lines about IDPs seem too much idealistic. What if we fail to treat IDPs in the way you mentioned--which,apparently, we are--and they become a cause for more “deadly game” in future ? Would you then still justify the Army Operation as an effective option in counter-terrorism strategy?

You say that it is the duty of ulema to come out and clarify Islamic position on suicide bombing. But you know very well that the terrorists kill anyone who tries to stand against them. They recently murdered the Tahreek-Taliban Afghanistan commander in D I Khan.The terrorist assassination of Maulana Sarfaraz Naeemi a couple of weeks ago is another such instance.

Maulana's views were against what Taliban were doing in Swat. In such a situation, how could anyone take responsibility to confront the terrorists, as the fear of Taliban is prevailing in the country.

As you have mentioned, the government has taken strict action against them and made other arrangements to protect people's lives. Still the authorities could not protect such high profile scholars.

Why the Taliban were not active in Pakistan before 2004?

Isn't this a fact that General Musharaf accepted all the demands made by the US? He should have at least put his terms on the table, which he didn't.

Aren't we trapped in America's New Great Game?

Don't you think our ruling elites want money and, for that, they are ready to become Mir Saadiqs and Mir Jaffers?

Don't you think the Army is being misused? Instead of holding India responsible for whatever is happening in Pakistan, the army leaders are blaming Baitullah Mehsud. Are they taking instructions from the Pentagon, rather than using their own mind?

Can't we take a stand like Iran? You may argue that don't have enough resources as Iran does. But is the economy worth more than humun life?

Have the Americans finaly suceeded in turning their "War on Terror" into "Our own war" as stated by our politicians.

I guess we should let the tribal people live their own way oo life, and should keep intact the treaty that Quid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah concluded with the tribal leaders after partition. Finally, I wish you could present two sides of the picture not one, and let the people decide which one is right.

There is no other way except reconciliation, which can avert internal as well as external potenatial threats. However, the PPP and the PMl-N have been arch rivals, if we shuffle the pages of history. Therefore, their alliance either in the Centre or in the Punjab is politcally unnatural. Two big parties with two different ideologies--the liberal PPP and the conservative PML-N-N--cannot make a good and healthy political alliance. Let's take the example of India, where small parties got together and formed coalition governments in the Centre and in many provinces.

If the PPP wants democracy to flourish in the country, then it needs to have a strong opposition in the Centre as well as in the biggest province. This can help both the parties play their respective roles fairly in the larger interest of the nation.

The Muslim revolutionary movements adopted different means in different times. People like Syed Ahmed Shaheed thought that establishing a rule in a remote area inhabited by diehard Muslim traditionalists would provide them a platform. He intended to use that platform for operating and driving the foreigners and non-believers out of his homeland, thus bringing back the glory of Islam. Jamaluddin Afghani was of the opinion that that Pan-Islamism was the answer to this riddle. Intellectuals like Syed Qutb and Abul Ala Maudoodi thought that by developing a cadre of righteous and trained Muslims, they would be able to get the political power. They believed that only by getting hold of political power they would be able to bring about that long-awaited revolution.

With the advent of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, it seems that the wheel has completed full circle and has come back from where it had started. In Osama bin Laden, Mulla Omer and their allies, we see the reincarnation of the thought of Syed Ahmed Shaheed: if an Islamic sanctuary can be established in a remote area where local inhabitants are diehard Muslims, it can be used as a launching pad for Islamic revolution throughout the world. Isn't it a coincidence that the area chosen by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban for this purpose is the same as was chosen by Syed Ahmed Shaheed two centuries ago?

There is no harm in learning from the Western world, which is dominated the modernity discourse today, just as we dominated this discourse for several centuries post 7th century. In fact, millions of Muslims are played a very useful role in the rise of Western modernity today. It is only through such civilizational interaction that we can grow together.

Regarding this website, I think there is too little in it for a real debate on an important topic like “The Golden Age of Muslims” to start. I fail to understand why the author is using The Golden Age of Muslims” instead of the usual “The Golden Age of Islam” title. If in one of his future writings Mr Ishtiaq can answer this question, I will be grateful

The reason for the fall of Muslim empire was that we stopped this process of learning. The Mongol invasion of Baghdad might have played a role in the demise of Muslim empire. The Christian crusades might have had their own share in this respect, so might have the Inquisition of Andalusia.

The Caliphs committing vices might have been another reason for the decline of Islamic civilization. But, in my humble opinion, the primary cause of the fall was that we stopped the process of learning, of building upon the vast treasure of knowledge that we had acquired. We consequently became weak from inside, and that is why the outsiders, such as the Mongols, were able to destroy us, destroy our civilization, burn the libraries.

When the ISAF became operational, only 10 per cent of Afghans had access to health care facilities; now 80 per cent of Afghan population has health-care access. In late 2001, only one million Afghan children had access to education facilities, now six million of them go to schools, one-third of which are female students. Afghanistan’s Per Capita Income in the last seven years has doubled, and the country’s economy has tripled. So, all of these are credible achievements.

Security is a problem. For the purpose, I think the alliance needs to enhance its military capability, including more troops and greater combat role. Secondly, there is need to enhance military-civilian contribution for reconstruction. Thirdly, the Afghan government has to take on greater responsibility to deliver goods to the people.

There is also an upsurge in Taliban infiltration from Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. The reason is the agreement which Pakistani government has signed with pro-Taliban elements. Pakistan is facing its own war. But Pakistan has to understand that there has to be a regional solution to the Afghan problem.

The problem of Taliban insurgency is in the east and south. That is why the Americans are there. The good news is that the French have agreed to send troops to the region. The Italians are removing restrictions on the combat role of their troops. The insurgency in the east and the south has to be quelled, so that a space is created there for the development work.

In fact, at a time, when in the West we see people associating terrorism with Islam and depicting Muslims as terrorists, it would suit the Muslims not to associate religion with science. By doing so, they will be falling in the trap of those who believe in the “clash of civilizations” thesis. If Muslims associate everything with their religion, then they should not protest when some fundamentalists in the Western world link Islam with terrorism.

In my opinion, SCO is committed to establishing “a new international political and economic order.” Therefore, the organization may soon offer a challenge to America’s dominance in the world. Leaving its original focus on counter-terrorism in the dust, the SCO is growing into a strategic alliance between several of the world’s leading energy producers and two of its most hungry consumers. At the same time, the SCO has announced a desire to mitigate U.S. influence in the region and counter America’s global power. In this regard, and as a counter to Washington’s resented global presence policy, SCO members have pledged to the world a diplomacy of “non interference and non-alignment.”

In fact, SCO is gradually assuming an increasingly anti-American character seen clearly in its efforts to reduce the American presence in Central Asia. For example, in 2005, SCO members persuaded the government of Uzbekistan to deny American military forces use of the Karshi-Khanabad airbase in southeastern Uzbekistan that had been the leased by the U.S. government since 2001. More recently, in a veiled reference to Washington’s interests in Central Asia, the SCO issued a joint communiqué warning that the “differences in cultural traditions, political and social systems, values and models of development formed in the course of history should not be taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs.”

I also disagree with your frequent use of the expression “Muslim sciences” instead of “Islamic sciences.” I think “Islamic sciences” is a better expression. Belief in the oneness of God is central to Islam. This is the principal source for the entire activity that we see in the Universe. Muslim scientific exploration during the Golden Age was Islamic, because Muslim scientists had attempted to explore and explain the universal reality within the context of Islamic principle of Tauheed.

Ahmad and Ismail were killed at Balakot in May 1831, while waging an unsuccessful jihad against Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s empire. The two men had set out with 600 followers from Rae Bareilly five years earlier to defend Islam at a time when the Mughal power had, for all practical purposes, given way to British rule.

We could learn lessons from Sayyid Ahmad’s failed jihad. The Balakot jihad was defeated, in part, because of the superior military resources and intelligence assets of Ranjit Singh’s armies — and also, historian Ayesha Jalal reminds us, because of the resistance of the Pashtun tribes to Sayyid Ahmad’s coercive, Shariah-based order. India’s politicians must reach out to the young people drawn to the jihad if it is to be defeated, and restore faith in the idea that democracy can indeed deliver justice

Syed Ahmed had already served in the army of the Yousafzai state of Tonk in India. So he chose the area of Yousafzais, knowing well their enthusiasm for religion. He presented himself as a devout Muslim and promoted his cause as a fight for the supremacy of Islam, just as bin Laden does today. Local Pashtuns naturally welcomed him and assured their support for his cause of serving Islam. With their help, he was able to defeat the forces of the Punjab Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh in the battles of Akora Khattak (1826) and Hazro (1827).

With two successive victories and thousands of Mujahideen fighting under him, Syed Ahmed declared areas under his influence as an Islamic state and titled himself as Emir-ul-Momineen, and then started fiddling with the Pashtun culture and social values. Upon this, two prominent Sardars of Peshawar, Sardar Yar Mohammad Khan and his brother Sultan Mohammad Khan rose against the Indians. The Sardars were defeated in the ensuing battle. Yar Mohmmad was killed and Sultan Mohamed was captured. However,later, he was released and appointed as Sardar of Peshawar by Syed Ahmed as part of a compromise deal. Still the Yousafzais’ revolt against Syed Ahmad and his Indian jihadi warriors continued. In the ensuing battles, the Pashtuns almost destroyed the Indian army of Syed Ahmad, forcing him and several hundred jihadis to flee to Hazara and Kashmir regions. Syed Ahmed himself was killed by the Sikhs in 1831.

In the 19th century, Syed Ahmad, just like today’s al-Qaeda-Taliban nexus, tried to enforce his Wahhabi ideas in Pashtun lands and started interfering in local Pashtun culture and traditions. He tried to eliminate the codes of Pashtunwali, and attempted to replace them by the fundamentalist ethos of Wahhabism. He loathed local tribal elders and abolished the traditional Pashtun Jirga system. These actions were sufficient to provoke the Pashtuns and unite them against Syed Ahmed.

We can foresee the same outcome in the current scenario: al-Qaeda’s jihadi agenda may have entrapped the Pashtuns once again. However, as Talibanization increasingly increasingly endangers the traditional Pashtun culture and values, we can look forward to the same en masse Yousafzai/Pashtun revolt as was instrumental in the fall of Syed Ahmed in the first quarter of the 19th century.

Also interesting is the affiliation of Sufis to this cause, e.g. Izz al-Qassam who began the military wing of Hamas was a Sufi. Furthermore, major Wahhabi muftis like Bin Baz condemned Bin Laden and his group in the 90s when most hadn't even heard of Bin Laden. Wahhabis also condemned the killing of innocents and suicide bombing in the strongest of terms. So, where does the Wahhabi link come from? Is it that they advocate fundamentalism, xenophobia, puritanism and anti-traditionalism? The political Wahhabis have been friends with the West ever since they gained power and ideologically opposed the Ikhwan. Furthermore, they are Hanbalis by their own claim although they differ to some degree with mainstream Hanbalism and advocate a softer form of Taqlid and more critical thinking (Ijtihad). For example, Idjtihad and Taqlid in 18th and 19th Century Islam by Rudolph Peters compares the Ijtihad advocated by Shawkani, Sanusi, Shah Waliullah and Hamid ibn Nasir ibn Muammar (a Wahhabi) and it turns out the Wahhabi was the strongest in favour of Taqlid along with Dehlawi and the strongest against were Shawkani and (the Sufi) Sanusi. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's reform was directed towards Muslims in his emphasis on Tawhid, and not towards a global jihad; he and his son Abd Allah explicitly denied any antipathy to Sufism per se, although later Wahhabis rejected Sufism.

Moreover, with reference to the work of John Voll, the eighteenth and nineteenth century reforms carried out by Sufis e.g. Ahmad ibn Idris al-Fasi, Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi, Uthman ibn al-Fudiye, the Naqshbandis Syed Ahmad Shaheed and Ismail Shaheed, Shah Waliullah al-Dehlawi (some who called themselves Taraqa Muhammadiyya, indicating their revival) had the following in common: a)Strongly advocating Ijtihad and opposition to madhhab-fanaticism (e.g. Waliullah in al-iqd al-jid and al-Sunusi in iqaz al-wasnan); b) an emphasis on Hadith scholarship; c) an antipathy to popular religion and saint veneration (Ibn Idris even changed the shaykh-murid relationship to one of ustadh-talib); and opposition to cultural practices.

If these in any way mean "fundamentalism" (as they do to Voll), it means they are a Sufi phenomenon, internal and not external to the dynamics of Sunni intellectualism. Ahmad ibn Idris in fact enjoyed a close relation with Wahhabis, although he disagreed with them in their near total rejection of Sufism and their branding of other Muslims as kafirs or mushriks; but he agreed with them in in their emphasis on tawhid, opposition to popular religion and extreme Taqlid. Wahhabis are not anti-taqlid unlike the Ahl Hadith like Shawkani, Siddiq Hasan Khan and Al-Albani, whereas the latter are invariably politically inactive (in fact Albani thought the Palestinians should withdraw for which the Sufi Buti blasted him).

So, to ask: is it fair to blame Wahhabis? And are not some of the reforms Wahhabis advocated closer to the Sunni/Sufi spirit? But we're just afraid to say so because of being branded "Wahhabis" (which became a derogatory word especially in India, even for those who had no relation with them whatsoever - Ahmad Shaheed, for example, had written Sirat Mustaqim and created his Tariqa before his visit to Mecca and Ismail Shaheed taught Sufism in Mecca)? I am certainly not advocating terrorism or the like which we all condemn, but asking for an intellectually honest position.