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Revamping the NATO Mission in Afghanistan |
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Ishtiaq Ahmad |
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IPRI Journal
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Vol. 8, No.1 (Winter 2008), pp 53-69 |
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 The battle against Taliban and their extremist affiliates in Afghanistan cannot be won by military means alone. A twin-pronged strategy based on the use of force against the Taliban and their extremist affiliates directly engaged in terrorism, and the pursuit of dialogue with those among the Taliban who are willing to compromise for the sake of legitimate political and economic benefits, has greater chances of success. Given that, NATO has to adopt a flexible approach on the issue, rather than relying upon a single option of using force to combat Taliban-led militarism in the country. Afghanistan’s NATO-led security sector reforms, including the expansion of Afghan national army and police and realization of Afghan reconstruction goals, depend upon how quickly the manifold causes of Afghanistan’s insecurity dilemma are addressed effectively. Apart from Pashtun alienation from the country’s power structure, these include the culture of warlordism and its close affinity with the drug problem, the continuing problem of refugee presence in Pakistan’s tribal region and its linkage with insurgency in Afghanistan, and the negative local and regional perceptions about NATO’s Afghan mission. By using force alone as a principal counter-insurgency means, and without taking forceful steps to combat drug problem and warlords involved in it, NATO cannot hope to achieve credible results in its current security-cum-reconstruction mission in Afghanistan. And, obviously, if NATO fails in Afghanistan, it cannot hope to play an effective role in international peace and security.
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